Sources, New Testament

The teaching of justification through faith as it has generally been understood in reformed theology since Luther emphasizes either the role of the individual’s faith or the role of God’s faithfulness in justification. Since the New Perspective the focus has shifted towards more social understandings of Paul’s concept of faith. New communal models are argued for that describe pistis as eschatological participation in Christ or as replacement of the law as social boundary marker. In order to understand the pistis-vocabulary of Paul better, it is helpful to situate it in contemporary usage. Drawing from the field of cognitive linguistics, we may ask ourselves in what contexts, or ‘forms of life’, pistis, fides and cognates were ‘at home’. In this paper I will discuss a selection of passages from several Latin and Greek sources (roughly) contemporary to Paul that highlight both civic and religious aspects of pistis/fides. These sources show how pistis/fides was considered a prominent civic virtue, was propagated in political theory as the social cement of society, and was regarded as a condition for justice. As such, this social aspect is closely related to religious piety. According to authors like Cicero, Plutarch and Epictetus it was the gods who gave pistis/fides to humanity, who possess the quality of pistis/fides in a more perfect manner, and who are even supposed to be imitated in pistis/fides. These uses of pistis/fides question the scholarly consensus that the Pauline concept of faith derives its meaning solely from the Septuagint translation or from Hellenistic Judaism, owing nothing to Paul’s Greco-Roman environment. On the contrary, to Paul’s pagan public, faith/trust appears to have been a common civic and religious notion. Furthermore, the frequent use of sociopolitical words in Paul substantiates the claim that Paul’s message of faith is as much about mutual solidarity and communal trust in God as it is about personal salvation. I conclude with a few suggestions how these insights could inform a reading of specific Pauline texts in order to explore this potential.

Paul’s approach to slavery has frequently been deemed similar to that of the contemporary Stoic philosopher Seneca. Both seem to consider the external condition of being a slave a matter of indifference, while stimulating virtuous behaviour on the master’s side, thus maintaining the system on a structural level. An analysis of two of their writings, Paul’s Letter to Philemon and the 47th letter of Seneca’s collection of Epistulae Morales, demonstrates that while both share metaphysical concepts, such as the brotherhood of slave and freeman, Seneca’s approach remains limited to the personal sphere, whereas Paul ultimately aims at reversing the existing power-relations.

As a Platonist, Plutarch acknowledges a clear ontological separation between the sensible and the metaphysical world, and together with it a neat distinction between the corresponding levels of cognition, opinion and knowledge respectively. Yet at the same time, his high regard for, and personal contributions to, the study of natural phenomena show his conviction that a crossing of this divide is possible. The present paper explores three different epistemological models to evaluate how this tension can be solved. It argues that Plutarch rehabilitates the ontological status of the opinables, by stressing that the sensible world derives its existence and its reality from the intelligibles. Furthermore, it suggests that the key to understanding Plutarch’s preference for natural philosophy is his conception that the smallest elements are the highest cause of nature. Given that the metaphysical or divine world provides the underlying structure of the sensible world, it assures the possibility of true knowledge as well. In fact, the causal relationship between forms and matter is reversely the epistemological journey to knowledge.

The Pauline concept of pistis (faith, trust, persuasion) is in most scholarly evaluations either diagnosed as having an especially Jewish origin, alien to Hellenistic vocabulary, or as originating in Greek semantics, alien to similar Old Testament notions. In both cases, a distinction is made between the meaning of ‘trusting reliance’ or ‘faith in’, that is, pistis with a personal, relational object, and the meaning of ‘intellectual assent’ or ‘faith that’, that is, pistis with a cognitive, propositional object. In this essay, an alternative possibility is suggested by considering the use of pistis as a fundamental attitude (ēthos) as it was developed in Hellenistic philosophy, combining relational and cognitive elements. The argument is based on sources that belong to the diverse philosophical traditions that flourished throughout the Hellenistic age, including Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Platonism. They demonstrate that pistis played a significant role in the central endeavour which these philosophical schools had in common, that is, gaining a good fundamental attitude or ēthos. The author argues that precisely in the conception of pistis as a fundamental attitude, Hellenistic philosophy and the Pauline letters share a common ground. Moreover, it is through this shared horizon that Paul’s use of pistis can be understood in a broader way, encompassing both cognitive notions (proof, persuasion, assent), and relational aspects (trust, reliance, loyalty).

As a Platonist, Plutarch acknowledges a clear ontological separation between the sensible and the metaphysical world, and, consequently, a neat epistemological distinction between opinion and knowledge. At the same time, his personal contributions to the study of natural phenomena show his conviction that a crossing of this divide is possible. The present article explores three different epistemological models to evaluate how this tension can be solved.  It argues that Plutarch rehabilitates the ontological status of the opinables, by stressing that the sensible world derives its existence and its reality from the intelligibles. In fact, the causal relationship between forms and matter is reversely the epistemological journey to knowledge.

The teaching of justification through faith as it has generally been understood in reformed theology since Luther emphasizes either the role of the individual’s faith or the role of God’s faithfulness in justification. Since the New Perspective the focus has shifted towards more social understandings of Paul’s concept of faith. In order to understand the pistis-vocabulary of Paul better, it is helpful to situate it in contemporary usage. Drawing from the field of cognitive linguistics, we may ask ourselves in what contexts, or ‘forms of life’, pistis, fides and cognates were ‘at home’. In this paper I will discuss a selection of passages from several Latin and Greek sources (roughly) contemporary to Paul that highlight both civic and religious aspects of pistis/fides. These sources show how pistis/fides was considered a prominent civic virtue, was propagated in political theory as the social cement of society, and was regarded as a condition for justice. As such, this social aspect is closely related to religious piety. According to authors like Cicero, Plutarch and Epictetus it was the gods who gave pistis/fides to humanity, who possess the quality of pistis/fides in a more perfect manner, and who are even supposed to be imitated in pistis/fides. These uses of pistis/fides question the scholarly consensus that the Pauline concept of faith derives its meaning solely from the Septuagint translation or from Hellenistic Judaism, owing nothing to Paul’s Greco-Roman environment. On the contrary, to Paul’s pagan public, faith/trust appears to have been a common civic and religious notion. Furthermore, the frequent use of sociopolitical words in Paul substantiates the claim that Paul’s message of faith is as much about mutual solidarity and communal trust in God as it is about personal salvation. I conclude with a few suggestions how these insights could inform a reading of specific Pauline texts in order to explore this potential.

Oorsprongsnarratieven geven vorm aan de collectieve identiteit: waar we vandaan komen, wie we zijn en wat onze gezamenlijke toekomst is. In de Grieks-Romeinse oudheid bevatten narratieven over de oorsprong van de mensheid een aantal veelvoorkomende elementen: een goed,  rechtvaardig begin, vervolgens een periode van gradueel moreel verval, maar ook verwachtingen van een terugkeer naar het oorspronkelijke gouden tijdperk, onder een rechtvaardige heerser of door persoonlijke deugdzaamheid. Dit artikel betoogt dat Paulus
in zijn brief aan de Romeinen heel concreet aansluit op dit bekende narratieve patroon. ‘Rechtvaardiging’ is in dit licht bezien geen nieuw concept en moet niet zozeer worden begrepen als een tijdloze, individuele kwestie, maar als een historische, collectieve ingreep van God. Tegelijk helpt een vergelijking op het niveau van narratieven ons de unieke aanpassingen in Paulus’ boodschap te ontwaren: de focus op Christus, de voor eenieder noodzakelijke transformatie van de geest en de terugkeer van gerechtigheid in de vorm van grenzenloze gemeenschappen.

There is an ongoing debate in New Testament scholarship on the correct interpretation of Paul’s pistis Christou formulations: are we justified by our own faith/trust in Christ, or by participating in Christ’s faith and faithfulness towards God? This article contributes to the position of purposeful or sustained ambiguity by reading Paul’s imitation – and faith(fulness) – language against the background of Hellenistic-Roman thought on and practice of imitation. In particular, the mimetic chain between teachers and students training for a philosophical disposition, and the philosophical topos of ‘becoming like God’ (homoiōsis theōi) offer material valuable for comparison. Since pistis, fides and cognates are used in these settings as both a quality to imitate and as attitude towards a model, and since, conversely, imitation is very much involved in Paul’s pistis-vocabulary, it makes sense to read pistis Christou as shorthand for a mimetic movement of faith(fulness) via Christ towards God.

Two reading traditions are reflected in the ancient witnesses to Nahum 2:14, which can be referred to as ‘masculine’ (4Q169) and ‘feminine’ (MT, TJon, P), depending on the implied referent of the suffixes in this verse. It is argued in this contribution that the textual history of Nahum 2:14 and the origins of these two reading traditions can be explained from the relationship between the Hebrew words רכב and רב, which presumably go back to a common source *רכבכה. This can be taken as evidence that the masculine reading of Nahum 2:14 is the more original one, whereas the feminine reading is the outcome of textual corruption.